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Roger J. Miner
U.S. Circuit Judge

The Philip B. Blank Memorial Lecture
Pace University School of Law
November 9, 1998
7:00 P.M.
Professional Responsibility in Appellate Practice:
A View From the Bench

During my thirteen years of service as a United States Court
of Appeals Judge, I have witnessed a general deterioration in the
quality of appellate advocacy.

This deterioration has been

accompanied by, and is in large part attributable to, a decline
in the attention paid to the rules of ethical conduct governing
appellate practice.

It is my intention in this Lecture to

identify the rules of professional responsibility that have been
most disregarded by the appellate bar in recent years, to
describe how these rules have been violated, and to suggest
methods that would encourage and enforce adherence to ethical
standards in appellate practice.

My discussion of these matters

will center on the duty of professional competence and the role
of appellate judges in overseeing compliance by the Bar with the
governing ethical standards.

I shall also argue for an extension

of certain of these standards.
What follows, of course, are my own thoughts and
observations.

I have not sought the concurrence of any of my

colleagues or any other appellate judges.

Also, my references to

the Code of Professional Responsibility will be to the Code
adopted by the four New York Appellate Divisions and presently in
1
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force in this state. 1

The local rules of my court, which hears

appeals from all the United States District Courts in New York,
Connecticut and Vermont and reviews certain administrative
rulings, establish a disciplinary committee.

The committee is

charged to deal with misconduct "in respect to any professional
I

matter before this court that allegedly violates the rules of
professional conduct or responsibility in effect in the state or
other jurisdiction where the attorney maintains his or her
principal office." 2

I must confess that as Chairman of our

Rules Committee I was partially responsible for this multilateral
concept of an ethical code.

I am happy to note, however, that

the Judicial Conference of the United States is considering rules
of attorney conduct that would apply to all the federal courts in
the nation. 3

In any event, I think that the New York Rules are

representative enough for my purposes here.
Ethical considerations first come into play for the
appellate lawyer in the decision on whether to undertake
representation on appeal.
the attorney.

This is often a difficult question for

The Code prohibits unwarranted appeals,• and

frivolous appeals are sanctionable under the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. 5

On the other hand, the Code requires

diligent and zealous prosecution of arguably meritorious
appeals. 6

My own view on this issue is that far too many

frivolous appeals and far too many non-meritorious issues are
presented to appellate tribunals.
An examination of the volume of Anders briefs filings
2

supports my view.

It will be recalled that in Anders v.

California 7 the Supreme Court recognized that, in appropriate
circumstances, assigned counsel for indigent appellants in
criminal cases may withdraw from representation.

Certain

requirements were established in connection with the withdrawal
process:

'

counsel must conduct a conscientious examination

leading to his or her opinion that the case is wholly frivolous;
the request to withdraw must be accompanied by a brief that
refers to any arguable basis for appeal in the record; and the
appellate court itself must determine that there are no issues
worthy of appeal.'
Of the 850 criminal appeals filed in the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1997, 9 eighty-two were accompanied by Anders
briefs. 10

A few of these applications were rejected by the

court, as they are each year.n

These rejections have resulted

in some cases in the denial of legal fees for the authors of the
deficient briefs and the appointment of substitute counsel. 12
However, the Anders applications are granted in the vast majority
of cases, leading to summary affirmance of convictions in
criminal appeals totally without merit. 13
If appointed counsel for indigent appellants presenting
Anders briefs and the appellate courts that examine these briefs
can undertake searching examinations of the record and find no
basis for appeal in a substantial number of cases, how many
meritless appeals must there be in civil and criminal cases in
which appellants are represented by retained counsel?
3

From where

I sit, the answer is "plenty," ·and this is to say nothing of the
criminal appeals presented by court-appointed attorneys who
should have filed Anders briefs but did not.

Pressing appeals

that have no merit in these times of limited appellate court
resources and burgeoning caseloads is especially irresponsible,
!
for it delays the disposition of meritorious cases and issues.

Why do attorneys go forward with appeals they know they
cannot win?

I can suggest several reasons, none of which

contributes to the good reputation of the legal profession.

Some

attorneys pursue these appeals out of the desire to demonstrate
to the client that they are willing to fight to the end; some
fear that another lawyer may take the case on appeal if they do
not and the client thereby will be lost; some think it is
necessary to appeal in order to avoid malpractice claims or, in
criminal cases, .to be accused of ineffective assistance; some are
guided solely by their client's wishes; and some, most
unfortunately, are interested only in the billable hours
involved.
The Code prohibition against advancing claims unwarranted
under existing law carries exceptions for claims that "can be
supported by good faith argument(s) for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law. " 14
an important one.

The exception is

Without it, Brown v. Board of Education 15

would never have been brought to the Supreme Court.

We must take

care, however, not to let the exception swallow the rule,
especially in cases where a change in existing law might diminish
4

individual rights.

I am particularly concerned in this respect

with some public prosecutors and government lawyers who have a
tendency to "push the envelope."

We are all aware of the

special duty of prosecutors to protect the innocent 16 but
sometimes the ethical duty of zealousness turns into
I

overzealousness and thus overcomes considerations of duties to
the adversary, to the court and to the public.

When I was a

trial judge, it was my custom to conclude my instructions to the
jury in criminal cases with this well-known aphorism:

"Ladies

and Gentlemen, the question here is not whether the government
wins or loses in this case.
justice is done."
I

The government always wins when

Very often in our pre-charge conferences, the

prosecuting attorneys would say:

"Judge, do you really have to

\

give that one?"

Sometimes, the prosecutor's desire to win causes

him or her to lose sight of the need to see that justice is done.
I think that the Code of Professional Responsibility should
be taken beyond its present wishy-washy admonition and should
specifically caution government lawyers to exercise especial care
when arguing for the elimination of an established right.

I

think that the prosecution of appeals that seek to overturn longstanding privileges that the citizenry has come to know, cherish
and rely upon should be characterized and condemned as
overzealousness.

To seek to shift an appellate court into

activist mode for the purpose of shattering well-grounded
precedent without a particularly compelling reason is to ignore
the special concern that prosecutors must have to see that
5

justice is done and the rights of the public protected.
In a celebrated case, the Supreme Court recently was called
upon to decide whether the attorney-client privilege survives the
death of the client.1 7

The decision was one of several

necessitated by the activities of the Independent Counsel
I

appointed to investigate various matters involving the President
of the United States.

This case arose out of an investigation of

the dismissal of employees from the White House Travel Office.
Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster consulted with an
attorney in private practice, James Hamilton, in regard to the
investigation.

Hamilton took several pages of notes during a 2-

hour meeting with Foster and marked them "Privileged."
I

\

Foster

committed suicide nine days later, and the notes taken by
Hamilton were the subject of a grand jury subpoena issued at the
instance of the.Independent Counsel.

A motion brought by

Hamilton and his law firm to quash that subpoena ultimately
brought the issue of survival of the attorney-client privilege to
the Supreme Court.

The district court quashed the subpoena, the

Independent Counsel appealed, the Circuit reversed, 18 cert. was
granted, 19 and the Supreme Court. reversed the Circuit court .
According to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
scope of any privilege is to be determined by "the principles of
the common law .

. as interpreted by the courts .

light of reason and experience."

. in the

The Court had no difficultly in

finding that
[t]he great body of .
caselaw
supports, either by holding or considered
6

dicta, the position that the privilege does
survive in a case such as the present one.
Given the language of Rule 501, at the very
least the burden is on the Independent
Counsel to show that "reason and experience"
require a departure from this rule. 20
Of course, the Independent Counsel made no such showing,
contending only that the attorney-client privilege should not
apply in any case where the client is deceased and the
information sought is somehow relevant to a criminal proceeding.
No particularized need was demonstrated, and no special
circumstances were described.

Indeed, no effort was made to

justify this incursion into the entrenched privilege of attorneyclient communication.

There certainly was no presentation

regarding reason and experience as justification for departure
from the established common law principle.
articulated that principle as follows:

The Supreme Court

"It has been generally,

if not universally, accepted, for well over a century, that the
attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client in a
case such as this.

1121

The only support that the Independent Counsel could muster
for his argument was scholarly criticism and the testamentary
exception.

In rejecting the views of the scholarly critics, the

Court noted that "even these critics clearly recognize that
established law supports the continuation of the privilege and
that a contrary rule would be a modification of common law.

1122

My own general view of scholarly criticism is that it provides
great food for thought but I am usually glad it does not
represent controlling law.

Also, I recognize that it is rare for
7

academics to extol the status quo.

As to the testamentary

exception, it seems to me that its limited purpose -- to carry
out the intent of the testator
the client.

is very much in the interest of

In other matters, it may very well not be in the

client's interest for the lawyer to reveal confidences imparted
I

to him during the client's lifetime.

Referring to an 1897

case 23 wherein it had "recogniz[ed] the testamentary exception"
but "expressly assumed that the privilege continues after the
individual's death, " 24 the Court saw no reason to depart from
precedent.
It seems to me that the question of the post-mortem survival
of the attorney-client privilege generated more concern in the
{

general public than any other question presented to the Supreme

\_

Court in recent years.

A number of my non-lawyer friends sought

me out to ask how I thought the Supreme Court would decide.

What

secrets they had imparted to counsel I do not know, but their
concern was palpable.

A number of lawyers and law students who

discussed the question with me expressed fear that a decision
favorable to the Independent Counsel might foretell the end of
the attorney-client privilege entirely.

However, the Supreme

Court came to the rescue and there was a large sigh of relief in
the land.
How did it come to pass that the question was raised at all?
Partially, at least, it was due to the largely unbridled
authority of the Independent Counsel that was so aptly described
by Justice Scalia in his lone but prescient dissent in Morrison
8

v. Olson. 25

I do not perceive that a United States Attorney

would seek to appeal in the first instance or that the Solicitor
General would authorize an appeal in a matter such as this.

The

ancient privilege invoked is just too important to all Americans,
who take it as an article of faith that lawyers are bound by the
I

Code to preserve their confidences and secrets even as to matters
not covered by the attorney-client privilege.

And the Code does

so provide. 26 . An attorney faced with a decision whether to
appeal must be concerned with the rules of ethical conduct, and
must recognize that the Code sometimes requires that employment
be declined.
I turn now to the ethical duty of candor to the appellate
court.

It should go without saying that counsel must not

misrepresent the facts or the law when arguing an appeal. 27

I

could say that no panel I have ever served on has been subject to
such misrepresentations.
true.

I could say that, but it would not be

It certainly is rare, since counsel fully understand that

a violation of this rule is not only sanctionable but may be
fatal to an appeal.

More problematical for some, but not for me,

is the rule requiring the citation of adverse authority.
The Code that I have been tracking in this Lecture provides
that "[i]n presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall
disclose .

[c]ontrolling legal authority known to the lawyer

to be directly adverse to the position of the client and which is
not disclosed by opposing counsel. " 28

The American Bar

Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct puts it just a
9

bit differently:

"A lawyer shall not knowingly

. fail to

disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the
position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.'"'
Although one refers to controlling authority and the other refers
I

to authority in the controlling jurisdiction, I think that the
result is the same:

The duty to the tribunal supersedes the duty

to the client in connection with the disclosure of adverse
authority.
Many lawyers are not happy with this rule of conduct.

Their

contention is that duty to client is primary and that they should
have no obligation to bring forward anything that may work to the
benefit of the other side. 30

Professor Monroe Freedman, one of

my predecessors as Philip Blank Memorial Lecturer, agrees.

He

has written "that the best and most appropriate assurance that
adverse authorities and arguments will come out is the adversary
system itself. " 31

I must say that I strongly disagree.

No

matter how enamored we are of the adversary system as the great
engine in the search for truth, we must recognize its limitations
and cabin it with as many rules as are necessary to maintain as
even a playing field as possible.

These rules must include

certain responsibilities to the appellate tribunal.
Not all attorneys are equal in skill, and there is no reason
to permit the stronger to play the hidden ball trick with the
weaker.

I had hoped that we were moving away from the anything-

goes-for-a-client mindset of the adversary system.
10

I think that

an overly adversarial system is what has led the legal profession
into such a sorry state that rules of civility are specifically
required.

32

The public has come to expect Rambo-type litigation

because that is what lawyers have led them to expect.
must be reversed!

The trend

We must not lose sight of the fact that the
I

purpose of our enterprise is justice under the law and that
anything that moves us away from that purpose, including the nondisclosure of legal precedent, is to be condemned. 33
My own view is that candor to the tribunal should require
even more than the Rule requires.

I think that a lawyer should

cite pertinent authority from other jurisdictions to help the
court in its labors, even it the adversary fails to do so.

I

also think that there is no reason to say that it is wrong only
for the lawyer to omit the citation of contrary authority known
to him or her . . With modern computer research techniques,
precedent cases are easily knowable to all lawyers.

Beyond all

this, it may very well be counterproductive to one's case to omit
the citation of authority, whatever its source.

Even Professor

Freedman agrees that "it is tactically desirable for the lawyer
to cite and refute uncited authorities that are arguably
adverse." 34

Obviously, a lawyer cannot argue to distinguish,

modify or overrule an adverse precedent not mentioned in the
brief but discovered by the court on its own.
Unfortunately, there are a number of reported cases that
take lawyers to task for omitting pertinent authority. 35

As for

myself, I become very cross, to put it delicately, with lawyers
11

who try to mislead me in this way.

In one case argued before us,

a party who had lost in another circuit on the same issue
presented to us failed to cite the other circuit's decision.
panel was not pleased.

The

Concluding my observations on the duty of

candor, I refer once again to the case involving the post-mortem
I

survival of the attorney-client privilege.

In his brief to the

Supreme Court, the Independent Counsel writes in the first
sentence of his Summary of Argument:

"The court of appeals, the

vast majority of judicial decisions, virtually all leading
commentators, and the American Law Institute have properly
concluded that the attorney-client privilege should not apply
when the client is deceased. " 36

(

Notwithstanding the

testamentary exception, the vast majority of judicial decisions
say no such thing.
It is not enough to be zealous in advancing a client's
cause.

The Code specifies that "[a] lawyer should represent a

client competently. " 37

Among other things, lawyers are

prohibited by the Code from handling legal matters "without
preparation adequate in the circumstances. " 3 '

I have become

alarmed in recent years by the increase in the number of briefs
and oral arguments that appear to be lacking in adequate
preparation on the law and on the facts.

A few months ago,

during oral argument, I asked an assistant state attorney general
a factual question related to the procedural history of the case
he was arguing for the appellee.
belligerently,

He answered, somewhat

"I don't know the answer to that question; I was
12

not the trial counsel."

I suppose he thought that lack of

knowledge of the facts is justified if appellate counsel is
different from trial counsel.

When pressed on the question, he

reluctantly agreed to furnish the information in a Rule 28j
letter. 39

The letter arrived after we had issued an order

favoring the appellant.
Even more depressing is the state of briefing and written
argument on the law.

For example, it is surprising how often

parties fail to raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
I remember a case not long ago when we pressed the jurisdictional
question during oral argument, and both counsel insisted on
arguing the merits of the appeal.

They wanted to have the case

decided and did not want to be bothered with the issue of
jurisdiction.

They just did not get the point, although they may

have grasped it.when the appeal was dismissed, sua sponte, for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

There are a number of

decisions on the books dealing with just this sort of
dismissal. 40

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require

that briefs contain a statement of subject matter and appellate
jurisdiction. 41

I think that often very little thought is given

to the importance of this provision.
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure also require that
briefs "include for each issue a concise statement of the
applicable standard of review.•"'

The competent attorney will

ponder long and hard over the standard of review applicable to
the issues raised.

The more restrictive the standard of review,
13

the less chance there is for reversal on appeal.

Accordingly, it

is in the appellate attorney's interest to argue for a standard
that is most favorable to his or her case.

And yet we see, time

after time, counsel struggling unsuccessfully to overcome such
standard of review barriers as abuse of discretion in matters of
law and clearly erroneous in matters of fact.

On innumerable

occasions, we have stopped counsel for appellant during oral
argument and asked whether findings of fact are under attack.
Instead of getting the point that he or she is now in difficulty
and should proceed to another point, counsel inevitably presses
forward with unwinnable arguments regarding the weight of the
evidence. 43

Basic competence dictates close familiarity with

the standards of review.

If those standards cannot be met,

counsel should heed the advice of Professor Hazard:

"If the

legal question is not genuinely arguable, the case should not be
there at all. " 44

This admonition is along the lines of the same

point that I made earlier:

The first ethical consideration for

an attorney is whether to take an appeal at all.
Most oral arguments are made by attorneys who "wing it."
The lack of preparation is apparent in these arguments.

Counsel

often seem to be taken by surprise at a question from the court.
A frequent response is "I'll get to that" by attorneys who never
do.

An attorney once responded to my question this way:

you ask that question, Judge?"
from the court is:

"Why do

A frequent answer to a question

"That is not this. case."

The questioner

generally knows that the question assumes facts not in the case,
14

but may be testing the basis of counsel's theory and its
applicability to future cases.

A properly prepared attorney is

ready to distinguish the facts and the law in the question from
those in his or her case.
I think that the waiver of oral argument demonstrates a lack
I

of professional competence.

Although the situation may change,

my court allows oral argument to all who ask for it, except for
incarcerated pro se litigants.

As a practitioner at the

appellate bar, I would never waive oral argument.

Although its

importance has been downplayed in recent times, oral argument
presents an unparalleled opportunity to discuss the case with the
court, to get an idea of how the judges are thinking, to in
effect participate in the judges' conference and, what I consider
most fascinating, to hear the judges think out loud and debate
the merits among themselves through the medium of counsel.

Many

articles have been written about how attorneys should conduct
oral argument,

45

but it seems to me that most attorneys who

argue before us never have read any of them.
While competence in oral argument is greatly to be desired,
competence in the techniques of brief writing,
delineation, is even more desirable.

including issue

This is because we have the

briefs in hand before, during and after oral argument, and the
impressions they convey are longer-lasting than oral argument.
Many articles also have been written on brief writing, 46 but
these are in the main also ignored.

All too often, we see briefs

that are poorly organized, that wander off the point being made,
15

that make too many points, that have too many citations and
quotations, that are deficient in the citation of authority and
that are highly repetitive.

The purpose of a brief, like the

purpose of oral argument, is to persuade.

Unfortunately, too

many briefs fail to deliver.

-!
A recent decision in the Seventh Circuit assures me that I

am not the only appellate judge constrained to read bad briefs
written by lawyers lacking in competence.

After indicating that

the brief failed to demonstrate a knowledge of the difference
between subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction,
the court proceeded to address the nonjurisdictional contentions
as follows:

"The first problem with all of these

nonjurisdictional contentions is that [the appellant] , in some
eleven pages of 'argument,' cites not a single case or statute to
support his position.

1147

The court cited one of its earlier cases involving a sixpage brief without any citations in which the panel stated as
follows:

"'It is not enough for an appellant in his brief to

raise issues; they must be pressed in a professionally
responsible fashion.' " 4 '

It would seem to be a simple thing for

lawyers to heed the provision of Appellate Procedure Rule
28(a) (6).

The Rule provides simply that "[t]he argument must

contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented,
and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on."
comply with similar requirements. 49
16

Appellees must

Appellate counsel even have trouble with Anders briefs,
where they are required only to demonstrate that there is no
basis for appeal.

In a case that arose after Anders, the Supreme

Court was confronted with a situation in which a state appellate
court found an Anders brief inadequate but allowed counsel to
withdraw anyway. 50

On the basis of its own, thorough

examination of the record, the state tribunal identified several
arguable errors and reversed on one count.

The Supreme Court

thought that competent counsel should have been appointed and
faulted the appellate court for failure to do so. 51

In the

Second Circuit Court of Appeals, a dozen Anders briefs have been
rejected so far this year. 52
There is no reason why counsel should demonstrate
incompetence in appellate practice.

All counsel have the basic

tools to do the.job for their clients.

My view on this matter is

that the competence culprit is usually lack of preparation.
Procrastination is the hallmark of many attorneys, and the result
of procrastination is diminution in the time for preparation.
Poor performance inevitably results under these circumstances.
When my students come to my classes unprepared, I always give the
same admonition:

"An unprepared student becomes an unprepared

lawyer, and that works to the detriment of client, court and
justice system."
I would hold appellate attorneys to a high degree of
competence.

I would hope that their briefs and oral arguments

would meet a higher standard than we have seen in recent years.
17

All concerned, including the profession, would benefit greatly.
It seems to me that we leave too much "wiggle room" in the
competence area.

I agree with Professor Griffin in her criticism

of the application to appellate counsel of the rule announced in
Strickland v. Washington. 53

In Strickland, the Supreme Court

established a two-pronged test to be applied when a defendant
claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a criminal
case.

The defendant must show that his counsel's performance

"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" 54 and that
there was a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. " 55

According to the Court, the objective

standard for reasonable performance is "prevailing professional
norms.

1156

Circuit courts have applied the Strickland test to

issues of effective assistance of appellate counsel. 57
Professor Griffin has written that there is no justification
for the second prong of Strickland

the need to show that but

for counsel's errors the result would be different -- in
identifying ineffective appellate counsel. 5 '

Most persuasive to

me is her statement that "[t]he presence of an actual prejudice
requirement distorts the evaluation of performance so that the
standard is no longer .

'reasonable competence. ' " 59

The

professional duty of competence alone should dictate that one
whose conduct is below "prevailing professional norms"

a low

enough standard in today's world of appellate practice

does

not provide effective assistance to his or her client.
18

I could go on and on describing briefs and oral arguments
that fall below professional norms, but time does not permit such
a wide-ranging discussion of incompetent performances.

Deputy

Solicitor General Lawrence Wallace, who has argued more cases
before the Supreme Court than any other lawyer in recent times,
I

has said:

"If you can't answer the question,

'what are the

strongest points to be made for the other side?' you're not
really prepared to argue the case.

1160

I say that too many

appellate lawyers cannot describe the strongest point on either
side.

That is why the lack of competence is the number one

problem in appellate practice today, and that is why I agree with
my colleague, Judge Aldisert, that competent representation
should be the very first rule of professional responsibility. 61
The Code tells us that "a lawyer should assist in
maintaining the.integrity and competence of the legal
profession. " 62

This is an admonition not to be taken lightly by

appellate practitioners.

Maintaining the integrity of the legal

profession requires lawyers to refrain from dishonest and
improper conduct and to report the misconduct of others. 63
requires complete honesty to the appellate tribunal.

It

To me,

maintaining the integrity of the legal profession also requires
that lawyers adhere to ethical and moral principles in their
dealings with each other.

It requires lawyers to cooperate in

such matters as adjournments, waivers of procedural formalities
and similar items with which the client should not be concerned.
In my practice days, a client once "read me the riot act" for
19

agreeing to adjourn the argumerit of an appeal when a colleague
had a personal matter to attend to.

My response was that this

was my area of responsibility and did not involve any prejudice
to his cause.

I am not sure the client understood, but he did

not fire me.
In the United States Courts of Appeals, as in many state
appellate courts, the parties file an appendix containing those
parts of the record that are considered pertinent to the
appeal. 64

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure state as

follows:

"The parties are encouraged to agree, as to the contents

of the appendix. " 65

More and more, we are seeing parties unable

to agree on a joint appendix.

As a result, there is a separate

appendix filed by each party and a concomitant necessity for
judges to flip back and forth between two separate submissions.
This negates the purpose of the Federal Rule.

When counsel

refuse to cooperate, additional burdens are imposed upon the
court.

For example, there is no reason why a court must consider

a motion to adjourn in a case where the reason to do so is
compelling.

Wasting the time of the court and the adversary

violates the Rule requiring lawyers to maintain the integrity of
the profession.
A profession lacking in collegiality is a profession lacking
in integrity.

Lawyers are engaged in a joint enterprise, a fact

that is often overlooked in the modern practice of law.

Lawyers

are responsible for each other, and what one does reflects on
all. 66

When I see briefs that seek sanctions against other
20

lawyers for bringing or defending appeals that are clearly
meritorious, when I see unfounded accusations of conflict of
interest littering the record, when I hear arguments in which
attorneys spend their allotted time in criticizing each other
rather than in arguing the merits, I worry about the integrity of

'

the legal profession.

Of course, the profession has improved in many ways since I
started to practice law some forty years ago.

These improvements

have not extended to the collegiality of the Bar, however.

As a

young lawyer in my father's office, I was taught that there would
be no charge to a lawyer who came to us for advice or assistance,
that the widows and children of deceased lawyers were also
entitled to services without fee, that attendance at Bar meetings
was mandatory and, horror of horrors, that the Bar Association's
minimum fee schedule must be adhered to.

The passing of the

minimum fee schedule may have been a good thing, but the passing
of other indicia of collegiality may be a real loss.

Ten years

ago, I wrote an article entitled "Lawyers Owe One Another. " 67
In the article, I detailed the neglect of the duties of honesty,
fair dealing, cooperation and civility owed to lawyers by each
other.
decade.

I find little improvement in these areas over the last
The reputation of the Bar has suffered accordingly.

In the discharge of the duty to maintain the competence of
the Bar as regards appellate practice, it seems to me that the
Bar should take a greater interest in educational programs
devoted to appellate practice.

Although some Bar Associations
21

sponsor courses in appellate practice from time to time, I think
there is a great need for more programs of that kind.

Mandatory

Continuing Legal Education has been adopted in most states,"
and New York recently was added to the list. 69

I am hoping that

a number of MCLE courses will be devoted to appellate practice as
I

New York develops its program.

Seasoned appellate lawyers should

teach law school courses on the handling of appeals.

The

widening gulf that has grown between practitioner and law school
teacher makes it especially important that lawyers-to-be get a
good grounding in the professional responsibilities that surround
appellate practice. 70
Lawyers may assist in maintaining the professional
competence of the Bar in other ways.

In olden times, lawyers

helped each other by reviewing briefs and listening to proposed
oral arguments, .and I am not referring here to lawyers in the
same firm.

In my younger day, I clerked for a short time at a

one-person law firm located in a large office building in
downtown Brooklyn.

My employer often would send me down the hall

to talk to some of the older l'awyers in other offices about
briefs we were preparing and to secure their advice.
happy to take the time to help a young lawyer.

They were

They saw it as

helping to maintain the competence of the profession.

In those

days, young lawyers were welcomed to the Bar and helped by older
members in all phases of practice.
I am given to understand that that is not the case today.
am sure that in large law firms and government off ices lawyers
22

I

read and comment on appellate briefs prepared by other lawyers
who are not working on the particular appeal and provide moot
courts for appellate arguments.

Thus is professional competence

in appellate practice maintained.

Lawyers in different firms who

have no positional conflicts can also help in this way.

'

It is also important for appellate lawyers to heed the
professional duty of assisting and improving the legal system. 71
Nothing pains me more than to hear a lawyer complain about some
court procedure just to vent some steam.

We are always willing

in our court to listen to suggestions for improvement from the
Bar.

We welcome such suggestions.

Several Bar Associations have

committees that regularly submit reports on various defects that
they perceive to exist in our system.
consideration.

Each is given careful

Indeed, we are required, before making any

changes in our local rules of practice, to solicit public
comment. 72
Whether as an individual or as a member of an organized Bar,
we expect that lawyers who engage in appellate practice will
communicate their concerns to us.

Just recently, the Federal

Courts Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York presented us with a report suggesting changes in our summary
order procedures. 73

That report, like all others submitted to

us by lawyers or groups of lawyers will receive close
consideration.

All courts encourage the performance of the duty

to assist in improving the legal system and I, for one, think
that the lawyers are not critical enough of the courts before
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which they practice. 74
It seems to me that appellate judges do not do enough to
advance the cause of professional responsibility in appellate
practice.

I do not know how many robing room conversations I

have had with colleagues when they (or I) have made such comments
as,

"that was a terrible argument" or "the brief made no sense"

or "counsel missed the controlling case" or "the facts were not
correctly represented to us" or "the statutory interpretation
urged upon us was totally without support."

Despite the

frequency of these comments, it is a rare case in which we
sanction even those who take frivolous appeals. 75
Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure allows

(

us to "award just damages and single or double costs to the
appellee" if we determine that an appeal is frivolous.

Rule 38

sanctions are sometimes assessed against both attorney and
client, because, as we say,

"attorney and client are in the best

position between them to determine who caused [the] appeal to be
taken. " 76

Such sanctions are to be applied where an appeal "is

totally lacking in merit, framed with no relevant supporting law,
conclusory in nature and utterly unsupported by the evidence. " 77
Appeals that are meritless but not frivolous do not qualify for
the sanctions. 78

Perhaps that is putting too fine a point on

it, because appeals that are totally lacking in merit are by
definition frivolous.
Aside from the occasional sanction of a lawyer for taking a
frivolous appeal, appellate judges generally ignore violations of
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ethical norms. 79

By doing so, they are in great part

responsible for the problems of which they complain.

Appellate

judges have a positive obligation to monitor, encourage and
enforce adherence to standards of professional responsibility.'°
They should not shirk that obligation because it is so important
to our system of justice.
There are many methods by which appellate judges can
encourage and enforce ethical rules.

For example, the Tenth

Circuit recently invoked Rule 46(c) of.the Rules of Appellate
Procedure to sanction an attorney for what the court described as
"egregious mischaracterizations of the record. " 81

Rule 46 (c)

allows a court of appeals to "take any appropriate disciplinary
action against any attorney who practices before it for conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar or for failure to comply with
these rules or <;1ny rule of the court."

Unfortunately, my court

has not made use of this Rule 46(c) for many years.

The

presentation of an appeal without competent briefing or argument
and the failure to cite known and adverse precedent, in violation
of the Code, certainly can be characterized as conduct unbecoming
a member of the bar, and may even violate rules of the court.
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure also authorize
courts of appeals to suspend or disbar attorneys from practice in
their courts for "conduct unbecoming a member of the bar." 82
have a local rule setting forth procedures for disbarment or
suspension, 83 but it is seldom invoked for misconduct in our
court.

We merely track disciplinary actions taken by state
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courts and rubber stamp their conduct.

A committee has been

established in our court to which we may refer accusations of
misconduct for investigation, hearing and report. 84

I have yet

to serve on a panel that has ref erred any business to that
committee.

In one recent case, a panel of our court did direct
I

the clerk to forward to state grievance committees for
appropriate action an order affirming a district court sanction
order that noted prior sanctions and admonitions to counsel for
unprofessional conduct in our court. 85
From time to time,

judges hint in their opinions that a

malpractice action against appellate counsel might be an option.
A malpractice action generally is not a good way to enforce
professional responsibility in appellate practice because a
successful suit requires proof that the underlying appeal would
have been successful. 86

An interesting malpractice action now

pending arises out of a claim that counsel made a mess out of his
argument before the United States Supreme Court. 87

The vote in

the Supreme Court was 5-4, 88 but counsel for the plaintiff in the
malpractice case will have a difficult time proving that a good
argument would have changed the swing vote.

I wonder whether the

plaintiff will call any Justices as witnesses.

If a litigant can

require the President to be a witness, why not a Justice of the
Supreme Court?
I think that some of the disciplinary sanctions that can be
used for Code enforcement ought to be applied to supervisory
lawyers.

The Code that I have been referring to imposes upon
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lawyers who supervised other lawyers responsibility for ethical
violations if the supervisor "knows or should have known of the
conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or
mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action." 89
Adherence to the Code is a collective responsibility, and those
I

who manage lawyers in large law offices, private or governmental,
should be responsible for keeping the faith of professional
responsibility.

According to a recent article in the American

Bar Association Journal, New York is "the only state to have a
set of disciplinary rules explicitly governing law firm conduct"
and is "likely to remain the only state." •o

The fact that many

law firms throughout the land oppose provisions for supervisory
responsibility reflects discredit upon the profession.
I think that there are kinder, gentler ways for appellate
judges to encourage lawyers to perform their professional
responsibilities, and I strongly urge my colleagues to pursue
these ways.

Appellate judges should take a greater interest in

law school education in appellate practice.

They should teach

law school courses in appellate practice and ethics.

They should

lecture on these subjects and take part as teachers in continuing
legal education programs.

They should attend Bar Association

meetings and interact with lawyers who practice in their courts.
Bar Association social occasions present excellent opportunities
for judges and lawyers to meet. 91

The large Bar Associations in

New York City, such as the Federal Bar Council and the
Association of the Bar, present judges with these opportunities,
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and judges frequently attend their events.

I think that perhaps

there has been too much interaction with the large Bar
Associations.

Appellate judges should save some time to get

around to smaller Bar groups for educational as well as social
events.
My experience has been that appellate lawyers are anxious to
talk to appellate judges.

Judges should use such discussions to

talk about ethical standards and the importance of adhering to
them.

I think that it is important for appellate judges to

compliment lawyers on good arguments and good briefs.
but not often enough.

We do this

These compliments show our recognition of

the lawyer's compliance with Code requirements of competence.

I

think we should include such remarks in our published opinions on
a regular basis, as we should include remarks that are critical
of lawyer conduct.

We should also note in writing those

situations where a lawyer has gone out of his or her way to
extend courtesies to opposing counsel and where adverse authority
has been cited.

I have said many times in the past that we are

all in this together.

This is best exemplified by a long-

standing tradition of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Richmond, Virginia.

Following oral argument

there, the judges come down from the bench and shake hands with
counsel. 92

It seems to me that the closer the relationship

between appellate judge and appellate lawyer, the greater will be
lawyer awareness of the Rules of ethical conduct required in
appellate practice.

Appellate judges have an important duty
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here.

Judicial ethics compel the performance of a great number

of other duties as well.

But that is a Lecture for another day.
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